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Introduction and summary
Thousands of new commercial banks have been char-
tered in the U.S. over the past two decades. As the
U.S. banking industry continues to consolidate, these
de novo banks are potentially important for preserv-
ing competition and providing credit in local markets.
However, like other new business ventures, newly
chartered banks initially struggle to earn profits, and
this financial fragility makes them especially prone to
failure. In this article, I document the financial evolu-
tion of the typical de novo bank and develop and test
a simple theory of why and when new banks fail.
Recent decades have seen an upsurge in the num-
ber of mergers and failures among new banks. Figure 1,
panel A shows the annual change in the number of
commercial bank charters in the U.S. since 1966. Prior
to 1980, the reduction in bank charters due to mergers
and failures was relatively stable at about 100 charters
per year, or about 1 percent of the industry total (fig-
ure 1, panel B). The pace accelerated greatly after 1980,
and since 1986 about 600 charters, or 5 percent to 6
percent of the industry total, have disappeared each
year due to mergers and failures.
To a large extent, this tremendous consolidation
can be explained by the repeal of federal and state
laws that restricted branch banking and interstate
banking. As these restrictions gradually were relaxed,
banking companies expanded their geographic reach
by acquiring thousands of other banks, and reduced
their overhead expenses by converting thousands of
affiliate banks into branch offices. This geographic
expansion, combined with newly deregulated deposit
rates, increased competition between commercial banks
just when new information technology was allowing
mutual funds, insurance companies, and the commer-
cial paper market to compete for banks traditional loan
and deposit businesses. Under these new competitive
conditions, many commercial banks became more vul-
nerable to economic downturns, and thousands of
banks failed during the 1980s and early 1990s. Over the
past two decades, the combined effect of these merg-
ers and failures has reduced the number of commercial
banks in the U.S. by nearly 40 percent.
This consolidation has been partially offset by
a recurring wave of new bank charters. As shown in
figure 1, panel A, over 3,000 de novo commercial banks
have been chartered by state and federal banking au-
thorities since 1980. It is generally believed that these
newly chartered banks can help restore competition
in local markets that have experienced a large amount
of consolidation. It is also commonly believed that
these newly chartered banks can help replace credit
relationships for small businesses whose banks failed
or were acquired or reorganized. However, before a
newly chartered bank can provide strong competition
for established banks and before it can be a dependable
source of credit for small businesses, it must survive
long enough to become financially viable.
I begin by examining the conditions under which
investors are likely to start up new banks, including
the influence of business cycles, merger activity in
local banking markets, and the policies of federal and
state chartering authorities. Next, I track the evolution
of profits, growth rates, capital levels, asset quality,
overhead costs, and funding mix at more than 1,500
commercial banks chartered between 1980 and 1994.
These data suggest that newly chartered banks pass
through a period of financial fragility during which
they are more vulnerable to failure than established19 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 1966–98, “Change in number of insured commercial banks,”
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percent







banks. Specifically, new bank capital ratios quickly
decline to established bank levels, but new bank
profits improve more slowly over time before attaining
established bank levels.
Based on these empirical observations, I develop
a simple life-cycle theory of de novo bank failure, in
which the probability of failure at first rises, and then
declines with the age of the new bank. I use hazard
function analysis to test this simple theory for 303
new commercial banks chartered in 1985, just as the
wave of bank failures shown in figure 1 was picking
up steam. The tests offer support for the simple theory.
On average, the results suggest that newly chartered
banks are less likely to fail than established banks
during the first few years of their lives; however, new
banks quickly become substantially more likely to fail
than established banks; and, over an extended period
of time, new bank failure rates gradually converge to
the failure rates of established banks.
What are the implications of these results for
bank supervision and bank competition policy? The
results suggest that the policies in place during the
1980s successfully insulated new banks from economic
disruptions early in their lives, but were less success-
ful in preventing new banks from failing after the ini-
tial years. Clearly, de novo bank failure rates could be
reduced by requiring investors to supply higher
amounts of start-up capital or by requiring banks to
maintain extranormal capital-to-asset ratios in the early
yearsindeed, the latter policy option was adopted
by federal bank supervisors during the 1990s. How-
ever, failure-proofing de novo banks is not an optimal
policy. The social costs of small bank failure are rela-
tively low, and setting higher capital requirements
would at some point discourage investment in new
banks and thereby limit the competitive benefits of
de novo entry.
Birth of new banks
As illustrated in figure 1, panel A, the number of
new banks started up each year has ebbed and flowed
over the past three decades. There are a number of
explanations for these patterns. Like all new business
ventures, new banks are more likely to form when
business conditions are good. For example, new bank
charters bulged to well over 250 per year during the20 Economic Perspectives
general economic expansion of the mid-1980s. This
high rate of bank start-ups also coincided with the
relaxation of unit banking laws in a number of states,
laws that had prevented banking companies from
operating affiliates in multiple locations. The steady
decline in new charters during the late 1980s and early
1990s, which bottomed out at about 50 new banks per
year, also had multiple causes. Difficult times in regional
banking markets made new bank start-ups unprofit-
able in many regions (bank failures reached their peak
in 1988), and a national recession in the early 1990s
reinforced this trend. New bank charters have been
on the increase since then, reaching over 100 per year
in 1997 and 1998, in large part due to the extended
economic expansion of the 1990s.
Conditions in local banking markets also influence
bank start-ups. Moore and Skelton (1998) find that
there are more de novo banks 1) in markets that are
experiencing healthy economic growth, 2) in highly
concentrated banking markets in which competition
among existing banks is weak, and 3) in markets where
small banks are under-represented and, hence, small
businesses are not being adequately served. These
results imply that new banks will be more likely to start
up in local markets where mergers have reduced the
number of competing banks, and where the resulting
market power has reduced the level of banking ser-
vices. In such markets, new banks should receive a
profitable welcome from customers unhappy with
paying high prices for financial services or from busi-
nesses whose credit relationships were disrupted
when their bank was acquired or failed. Researchers
only recently began investigating these phenomena,
so there is not yet a consensus on the results. In a
study of de novo bank entry in all U.S. markets be-
tween 1980 and 1998, Berger, Bonime, Goldberg, and
White (1999) find that the probability of de novo entry
is higher in local markets that have experienced mergers
or acquisitions during the previous three years, partic-
ularly mergers and acquisitions involving large bank-
ing organizations. In contrast, Seelig and Critchfield
(1999) find that local market entry by acquisition deters
entry by de novo banks and thrifts.1 Their results
are based on a study of de novo banks and thrifts
between 1995 and 1997, a time when banking condi-
tions were exceptional and restrictions on geographic
mobility were virtually nonexistent.
Differences in the policies of the legal authorities
that grant commercial bank charters can also affect the
rate and location of new bank start-ups. A de novo
national bank receives its charter from the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), while a de novo
state bank receives its charter from the banking
commission of the home state. The OCC has histori-
cally been more liberal in granting charters than most
state authorities. Its policy has been that market forces,
not the chartering authority, should determine which
local markets need and can support new commercial
banks. In contrast, many state chartering authorities
have historically applied convenience and needs tests
when considering applications for new bank charters,
denying applications if they judge that the conve-
nience and needs of the banking public are already
adequately served. Although this federalstate differ-
ence in chartering philosophy has diminished over
time, DeYoung and Hasan (1998) find that national
banks were chartered with greater frequency than
state banks during the 1980s and early 1990s, and that
the financial performance of de novo national banks
initially lagged that of de novo state chartered banks.2
This suggests that national banks chartered during
the 1980s were likely to have had a higher probability
of failure than newly chartered state banks operating
under similar economic and market conditions.
A concern shared by all chartering authorities is
that newly chartered banks start out with enough
equity capital to survive through the several years
of negative earnings and rapid asset growth that is
typical of de novo banks. The dollar amount of start-
up financial capital required for approval might be $3
million, $10 million, or even as much as $20 million, de-
pending on the proposed location and business plan
of the prospective bank. Larger amounts of start-up
capital are generally required for urban banks, for
banks locating in vibrant economic markets, and for
banks with business strategies that feature fast growth
(for example, a new Internet bank).
Once a new bank opens its doors for business,
regulatory scrutiny shifts from the applications staff
to the examination staff. Bank supervisors pay closer
attention to newly chartered banks than to similarly
situated established banks, although the difference in
treatment varies depending on the new banks prima-
ry regulator. Federal Reserve supervisors will conduct
full scope examinations for safety and soundness at
a newly chartered bank at six-month intervals (estab-
lished banks are examined every 12 to 18 months) and
will continue to schedule exams at this frequency
until the bank receives a strong composite CAMEL
rating (that is, a rating of 1 or 2) in two consecutive
exams. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
requires that all newly chartered state and national
banks maintain an 8 percent tier 1 equity capital-to-risk-
based assets ratio for their first three years of opera-
tion, while the Federal Reserve requires new state
chartered Fed member banks to hold this ratio above21 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
9 percent for three years. These temporary extranor-
mal capital requirements for new banks (the tier 1
requirement for established banks to be considered
adequately capitalized is only 4 percent) are a rela-
tively recent supervisory response to de novo failure
experience of the 1980s. Bank supervisors also prohibit
new banks from paying out dividends for several
years and, in some cases, require new banks to main-
tain minimum levels of loan loss reserves.
Evolution of new banks
Relatively few research studies have examined
how banks grow and evolve in the years immediately
after they receive their charters.3 Brislin and Santomero
(1991) show that the financial statements of a new
bank can fluctuate rapidly and dramatically during its
first year. A handful of studies have examined how the
profitability of de novo banks grows over time (for ex-
ample, Hunter and Srinivasan, 1990, and DeYoung
and Hasan, 1998). Another strand of research docu-
ments how small business lending becomes less impor-
tant to de novo banks as they mature (for example,
DeYoung, Goldberg, and White, 1999). In this section,
I analyze how a broad group of de novo bank charac-
teristics not typically considered in the literature evolve
over time, including de novo bank profits, growth rates,
capital ratios, sources of income, financing mix, over-
head ratios, and loan quality.
Each of the eight panels in figure 2 examines a
different financial ratio and compares its average val-
ue for a sample of de novo commercial banks to its av-
erage value for a sample of established commercial
banks. The de novo bank sample includes 4,305 obser-
vations of commercial banks that were chartered be-
tween 1980 and 1994, were between one and 14 years
old when they were observed, and were located in
urban banking markets. The established bank sample
includes 4,305 observations of commercial banks that
were at least 14 years old when they were observed,
operated in urban banking markets, and were similar
to the de novo banks in terms of asset size. These
two samples of banks were originally constructed by
DeYoung and Hasan (1998). Box 1 contains additional
details about the two bank samples.
To construct each of the graphs in figure 2, I divid-
ed the de novo banks into 14 separate age groups
(one-year old banks, two-year old banks, etc.). I then
calculated the median average for the financial ratio
in questionsay, return on assets (ROA)for each
age group. Plotting these 14 average values in chro-
nological order creates a time path showing how ROA
evolves as the typical de novo bank matures. Finally,
I superimposed the value of ROA at the 25th, 50th,
and 75th percentiles of the established bank sample
as horizontal lines over the de novo bank time path.
These horizontal lines serve as maturity benchmarks
against which to compare the progress of de novo
banks over time. The rate at which the de novo time
path converges with the maturity benchmarks indi-
cates the speed at which the de novo banks mature.
While each of the individual graphs in figure 2
has a straightforward interpretation when considered
in isolation, these eight panels reveal a richer story
when they are interpreted in conjunction with each
other. For example, by itself the return on assets (ROA)
graph (panel A) merely confirms the results of existing
studies of de novo bank profitability, that is, that the
typical new bank loses money until it is about 18
months old and continues to underperform the aver-
age established bank for about a decade. But when
the ROA graph is considered together with the asset-
growth (panel B) and equity-to-asset (panel C) graphs,
a simple theory of de novo failure begins to emerge.
De novo banks average an extraordinary 20 percent
annual rate of growth during the first three years of
their lives. While this fast growth rate is increasing
the amount of assets against which new banks need
to hold equity capital, the losses suffered during the
first and second years of these banks lives are deplet-
ing their equity capital. Despite initially high capital
levels, the equity-to-asset ratio of the typical new
bank declines very quickly, entering the established
bank range after just three years. Thus, panels A, B,
and C suggest the probability of failure should in-
crease as new banks pass their third year of life
their capital has declined to established bank levels
by year three, but their asset growth and profitability
do not converge with those of established banks
until at least year ten.
The remaining five panels in figure 2 are consis-
tent with the simple theory of de novo bank failure
suggested by the ROA, asset growth, and equity-to-
asset panels. For example, newly chartered banks ini-
tially have almost no nonperforming loans (panel D).
This is because these banks loan portfolios are com-
posed disproportionately of unseasoned loans made
recently to borrowers who demonstrated strong fi-
nancial fundamentals. However, as time passes some
of these new borrowers will naturally run into trouble,
and the quality of de novo banks loan portfolios will
naturally decline. This happens quite quickly for the
typical de novo bank, as its level of nonperforming
loans rises slightly above the median level for estab-
lished banks after three yearsjust as de novo
banks are depleting their excess capital cushions and
well before new bank profitability rates have matured.22 Economic Perspectives
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Financial ratio time paths for de novo banks
A. Return on assets
percent
B. Annual asset-growth rate
Notes: The data are described in box 1. The three colored horizontal bands are maturity benchmarks that indicate the twenty-fifth, fiftieth, and seventy-
fifth percentiles of the distribution of the ratio in question for the established bank sample. The black line plots the median value of the ratio in
question for the banks of various ages in the de novo bank sample. Return on assets is net income divided by total assets. Annual asset-growth rate
is the percent increase in total assets over the previous year-end total. Equity-to-asset ratio is the book value of equity divided by total assets. Ratio
of nonperforming loans is loans past due 90 or more days plus nonaccruing loans divided by total loans. Ratio of interest-bearing assets is total
performing loans plus total securities divided by total assets. Fee income ratio is noninterest income divided by net interest income plus noninterest
income. Ratio of large deposits is deposits in accounts greater than $100,000 divided by total deposits. Accounting efficiency ratio is noninterest
expense divided by net interest income plus noninterest income.
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BOX 1
Financial ratio time path data
Both the de novo bank sample and the established
bank sample were taken from a primary data set
used originally in a study by DeYoung and Hasan
(1998). For the current study, I added variables
from the Reports of income and condition  (call
reports). The primary dataset is an unbalanced
panel consisting of 16,282 observations of 5,435
small, urban commercial banks at year-end 1988,
1990, 1992, and 1994. Not all of the banks are present
in each of the four years because some banks failed,
were acquired, or received their charters during
the sample period. There are 2,611 banks present
in all four years, 977 banks in three of the four years,
1,005 banks in two years only, and 842 banks in just
one year.
Banks had to meet a number of conditions to
be included in the primary dataset. First, banks
had to have less than $500 million of assets (in 1994
dollars). By definition, newly chartered banks are
small, and established banks that are large will not
serve as good benchmarks against which to judge
the progress of young banks. Large banks have
access to production methods, risk strategies,
distribution channels, and managerial talent not
available to small banks. Second, all banks had to
be headquartered in metropolitan statistical areas
(MSAs). Demand for banking products, as well
as competitive rivalry among banks, can be quite
different in rural and urban markets, and may cause
young banks to develop differently in these two
environments. Third, banks had to be at least 12
months old at the time of observation. For example,
a bank that was chartered during 1993, but was
observed at year-end 1994, is referred to as a one-
year old bank. Brislin and Santomero (1991) find
that financial statements are quite volatile during
the first year of a banks operations, which makes
performance difficult to measure. Fourth, all banks
had to make loans and take deposits, eliminating
special purpose banks such as credit card banks.
Fifth, banks that were 14 years old or less (that is,
banks that would be in the de novo sample) were
excluded if they held more than $50 million in as-
sets at the end of their first year. This filter pre-
vents established banks that received new charters
as part of regulatory reorganizations and estab-
lished thrift institutions converting to bank char-
ters from being identified as de novo banks.
The resulting de novo sample comprises
4,305 observations of 1,579 different banks 14
years old or younger. Roughly 47 percent of these
de novo banks hold federal charters and roughly
21 percent are affiliates in multibank holding com-
panies. The established bank sample was con-
structed by choosing 4,305 observations of 1,514
different banks, each more than 14 years old, from
the primary dataset. Roughly 25 percent of these
established banks hold federal charters and
roughly 27 percent are affiliates in multibank
holding companies. The established banks were
chosen to have roughly the same asset-size distri-
bution as the de novo bank sample, as follows:
Banks more than 14 years old were grouped into
ten asset categories ($0$50 million, $50$100
million, ..., $450$500 million). Established banks
were drawn at random from each of these size cate-
gories, depending on the number of de novo banks
of each asset size. The assets of the resulting estab-
lished bank sample average $55.97 million with a
standard deviation of $49.64 million, compared
with the de novo bank sample average of $54.39
million and standard deviation of $48.70 million.
Obviously, there is no bright line that sepa-
rates de novo banks from established banks. I chose
the 14-year old threshold for two reasons. First,
it is the maximum age at which previous studies
refer to commercial banks as de novo (see Huyser,
1986, and DeYoung and Hasan, 1998). Second,
choosing a relatively large number for this thresh-
old ensures that the maturity benchmarks in figure
2 contain only banks that are fully mature.
The slow rate at which de novo bank profitability
improves appears to be attributable more to cost factors
than to revenue factors. Although the percentage of
de novo bank assets invested in interest-bearing
assets, such as loans and securities, starts out relatively
low and increases only slowly over time (panel E), the
typical de novo bank outperforms one-quarter of the
established banks in this area after only three years.
(De novo bank ROA does not reach the 25th percen-
tile benchmark until year six.) Even more impressive is
the speed at which new banks develop the ability to
generate fee income (panel F). The typical de novo
bank outstrips the average established bank in fee-
based revenues after only three years, and outper-
forms three-quarters of the older banks in this area
after about nine years. By virtue of their newness, de
novo banks may be less constrained by the inertia of
existing customer relationships and existing employ-
ee habits and, therefore, may be better able to impose
fees on retail customers or to enter into less traditional24 Economic Perspectives
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fee-generating lines of business. In addition, de novo
banks tend to start up in markets where business
conditions are strong, and selling fee-based financial
services may be easier in these markets.
In contrast to their reasonably strong ability to
generate revenue, newly chartered banks have a diffi-
cult time controlling expenses. De novo banks initially
use large deposits twice as intensively as do estab-
lished banks, and this disparity only slowly disap-
pears (panel G). This suggests that de novo banks
tend to finance their fast asset growth by purchasing
funds rather than by growing their core deposit base.
All else being equal, this is an expensive and poten-
tially risky financing strategy, because large depositors
are more sensitive to changes in interest rates than are
retail depositors and require higher rates to leave their
funds in the bank. The accounting efficiency ratio
graph (panel H) indicates that newly chartered banks
also have relatively high levels of overhead expenses
(for example, branch locations, labor expenses, and
computer equipment) and that these fixed factors of
production are not used at near full capacity for a
number of years. Excess overhead capacity not only
depresses bank profitability but, by increasing oper-
ating leverage, it makes bank profits more sensitive
to fluctuations in bank revenues.
Note that each of the panels in figure 2 exhibits
what is known as survivor bias, because some de novo
banks fail before they are 14 years old. For example,
average de novo ROA equals approximately 0.4 percent
for the three-year old banks, which is about twice as
large as the average ROA of 0.2 percent for the two-
year old banks. For the most part, this substantial im-
provement can be attributed to better performance as
young banks grow older and larger. But some amount
of this improvement occurs because some of the most
unprofitable de novo banks failed between years two
and three and dropped out of the sample. Although
this second explanation is responsible for only a small
amount of the large increase in ROA (as we shall see,
very few de novo banks fail after only two years of
operation), it is a good illustration of how survivor
bias can affect our results. Thus, the most exact way
to interpret the ROA time path is as follows: If a new-
ly chartered bank survives to be three years old, one
would expect its ROA to be about 0.4 percent. I revisit
the issue of survivor bias when I estimate time to fail-
ure models in a later section (see Estimating hazard
functions section, starting on page 26).
Hypothetical hazard rates
The time paths in figure 2 imply that de novo banks
will at first be very unlikely to fail, perhaps even less
likely to fail than established banks. Despite the losses
typically incurred during their first year of operation,
de novo banks initially have very high cushions of
equity capital and very low levels of nonperforming
loans. But the time paths in figure 2 also imply that
de novo banks become dramatically more likely to fail
as time passes, and quickly may become more likely
to fail than established banks. As de novo banks age,
their initially high capital cushions and low nonper-
forming loan ratios move rapidly toward established
bank levelsmuch more rapidly than their profitabili-
ty reaches established bank levels.
The combined effect of these financial ratio time
paths on the timing and probability of de novo bank
failure is suggested by the hypothetical hazard func-
tions in figure 3. A hazard function tracks changes over
time in the hazard rate, which is simply the probability
that a bank will fail at a particular time, given that it
has survived through all of the previous periods
leading up to that time.4 The horizontal line at P* rep-
resents the hypothetical hazard rate for established
banks, and the curved line plots the hypothetical haz-
ard rate for newly chartered banks. Although this fig-
ure is highly stylized, the relative shapes of the two
functions are consistent with the combined financial
ratio time paths shown in figure 2.
The constant, non-zero hazard rate depicted in
figure 3 for established banks is an obvious simplifi-
cation. Historically, established banks are more prone
to failure during recessionary periods, and almost
completely unlikely to fail during expansionary periods.
This simplification focuses attention on the issue of pri-
mary interest here, the failure rate of newly chartered
banks relative to the failure rate of established banks.
The hypothetical hazard rate for newly chartered
banks starts out at zero in figure 3, which makes sense
because these banks are so heavily capitalized at the
outset. But, as we saw in figure 2, de novo bank capital25 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
TABLE 1
Average Z-scores
Components of average Z-score
Cross-sectional
Number Mean capital- standard Average
of banks Median ROA to-assets ratio deviation of ROA Z-score
De novo banks
1 to 14 years old 4,305 .0057 .0957 .0230 3.97
Less than 3 years old 667 .0006 .1231 .0206 6.00
3 to 5 years old 1,424 .0050 .0814 .0287 3.01
6 to 10 years old 1,570 .0074 .0762 .0195 4.28
11 to 14 years old 644 .0089 .0795 .0155 5.70
Established banks
More than 14 years old 4,305 .0097 .0867 .0129 7.48
Notes: Z-scores were calculated using formula described in the text and data described in box 1.
The selected commercial banks are also described in box 1.
Source: Author’s calculations based on year-end data from the National Information Center,
1988, 1990, 1992, and 1994, “Report of income and condition,” selected banks.
ratios decline to established bank averages after
about three years, while de novo bank profits, asset
quality, and growth rates do not reach (or return to)
established bank levels for around ten years. When
these time paths are considered simultaneously, they
imply the hypothetical patterns displayed in figure 3.
The hypothetical hazard rate for new banks increases
at first (for example, between ages one and three) as
new banks become increasingly vulnerable to econom-
ic fluctuations; it exceeds the established bank hazard
rate for a time (for example, after year three); and it
eventually declines to converge with established
bank levels (for example, around year ten). Regardless
of the exact shape and timing of the de novo bank
hazard function, it must eventually converge with the
established bank hazard function, because by defini-
tion new banks that survive eventually turn into estab-
lished banks.
A rough way to check the relative accuracy of
the hypothetical hazard functions drawn in figure 3 is
to calculate Z-score probabilities of failure for de
novo banks and established banks. The Z-scores are
constructed as follows:
Z =  
ROA + equity / assets
standard deviation of ROA
.
The Z-score indicates the number of standard de-
viations that ROA would have to fall below its average
value in order to wipe out 100 percent of the banks
equity capital. For example, if a bank has 5 percent
equity capital and, on average, it earns ROA of 1
percent with a standard deviation of 1 percent, then
its Z-score would equal 6.00. In this case, the banks
ROA would have to decline by 6 standard deviations
below its average (to 5 percent) for its losses to ex-
haust its capital cushion. Thus, the higher a banks
Z-score, the lower its probability of failure. Z will in-
crease (that is, the probability of failure will decrease)
with higher levels of average ROA; Z will increase with
higher levels of equity to assets; and Z will increase
with lower variability in ROA.5
Table 1 displays Z-scores for the established
bank sample, for the de novo bank sample, and for
several subsamples of de novo banks. All of these
calculations employ the data used to construct the
graphs in figure 2. For each sample or subsample of
banks, Z is calculated using the median average of
ROA, the mean average of equity/assets, and the cross-
sectional standard deviation of ROA. (I use the median
ROA because the mean ROA is skewed downward
by banks that incurred large losses.) Because these
Z-scores are averages, they represent the likelihood
of failure for the typical bank in each sample.
In general, the calculations shown in table 1 sug-
gest that becoming insolvent is a relatively unlikely
event for the typical bank in these samples. For exam-
ple, the lowest Z-score (highest probability of insol-
vency) is 3.01, or about 3 standard deviations, for the
average three- to five-year old bank. Assuming that Z
is normally distributed, this implies only a 13 in 1,000
(0.13 percent) chance of becoming insolvent. Given
the large number of bank failures during the sample
period (see figure 1, panel A), the level of the failure26 Economic Perspectives
probabilities implied by these Z-scores is probably
too low.6 However, these Z-scores are still useful,
because they summarize the information in figure 2
into a single number that ranks the probability of fail-
ure across banks of different ages.
Overall, the analysis suggests that newly char-
tered banks are more likely to fail than established
banks: The average de novo Z-score of 3.97 is con-
siderably smaller than the average established bank
Z-score of 7.48. On average, de novo banks and estab-
lished banks have nearly identical capital-to-asset
ratios, so any difference in their implied failure rates
must be due to the level and variability of ROA. Indeed,
the median de novo bank ROA is only about half as
large as the median established bank ROA (.0057 ver-
sus .0097), and ROA is nearly twice as variable across
the de novo banks than across the established banks
(.0230 versus .0129).
Analyzing the Z-scores across de novo banks
of different ages provides some support for the shape
of the de novo bank hazard function in figure 3. The
implied probability of failure is relatively low for banks
less than three years old (Z = 6.00); is substantially
higher for three- to five-year old banks (Z = 3.01); and
then gradually declines toward established bank levels
for banks that survive beyond five years (Z = 4.28)
and beyond ten years (Z = 5.70). Looking at the com-
ponents of these average Z-scores reveals why the
probability of failure changes as new banks mature.
The youngest group of de novo banks are the least
likely to fail because their earnings are relatively stable
(although they average near zero) and their capital
cushions are large. The three- to five-year old de novo
banks are more likely to fail because, although they
have higher average earnings, their capital cushions
have been depleted and their earnings are highly vari-
able. Once banks are five to ten years old, increasing
earnings, increasing capital, and declining earnings
volatility all contribute to a reduced probability of
bank failure.
Estimating hazard functions
Next, I test whether the hypothetical hazard func-
tions in figure 3 accurately depict the relative rates at
which newly chartered banks and established banks
fail. The Z-score analysis discussed above provides
some support for these hypothetical hazard functions,
but that evidence is crude at best and suffers from
survivor bias in the data. In this section, I employ
more sophisticated techniques to estimate hazard
functions for both newly chartered and established
banks. These techniques explicitly account for survivor
bias caused by failures and acquisitions during the
sample period. In addition, these techniques generate
continuous (or nearly continuous) hazard functions
that can be plotted against time, making them easy to
compare with the shape of the hypothetical hazard
functions in figure 3. Finally, one of these techniques
tests whether differences in de novo and established
bank failure rates are caused by differences in these
banks locational, regulatory, or organizational char-
acteristics.
Data on bank failures
Table 2 displays some summary statistics for a
bank failure dataset Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
staff created for the purpose of this study. This dataset
contains 56 quarters of information on 2,653 banks
from 1985 through 1998, and is constructed from the
Reports of income and condition (call reports) and
from the failures, transformations, and attributes tables
in the National Information Center database. The
dataset includes 303 newly chartered commercial
banks that opened their doors during 1985 and 2,350
established commercial banks that had been in opera-
tion for at least 25 years in 1985. The established
banks each had less than $25 million in assets (1985
dollars); had equity capital equal to at least 5 percent
of their assets; and were located in states in which
at least four de novo banks started up in 1985. The
dataset tracks each of these 2,653 banks across time
and records the quarters in which banks left the
dataset because they either failed or were acquired
by another bank.
These data cover a period during which there
were economic disruptions of sufficient magnitude to
cause a statistically meaningful number of bank failures.
Commercial bank failures were extremely rare in the
U.S. during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, due to gener-
ally good economic times, regulatory limits on the risks
that banks could take, and legal entry barriers that
protected banks from competition. But the combination
of banking deregulation and volatile interest rates
during the 1970s and 1980s exposed banks to greater
risks and more competition. As seen in figure 1, panel
A, bank failures accelerated from near zero in 1980 to
over 100 failures per year from the mid-1980s through
the early 1990s. The catalyst for these bank failures
was a series of substantial economic disruptions,
including a general recession in the early 1990s and
a number of regional recessions in the mid- to late
1980s, the most disruptive of which was due to land
price deflations in Texas and other oil-producing states.
For the purposes of this article, I consider a bank
to have failed when at least one of the following27 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
occurs: 1) the bank is declared insolvent by its regu-
lator; 2) the bank receives regulatory assistance (for
example, a capital injection) without which it would
become insolvent; or 3) the bank is acquired soon
after its net worth has declined to less than 1 percent
of assets. In terms of raw percentages, 16.5 percent
of the de novo banks failed before the end of the 14-
year sample period. While this is over twice the 7.9
percent failure rate for the established banks in the
sample, it is well below the reported failure rates for
new (nonbank) business ventures. (See box 2 for a
short discussion of new bank failures versus new
business failures.)
Both the sample de novo banks and the sample
established banks were more likely to be acquired
than to fail during the sample period. The new banks
were more likely to hold state charters; to be located
in urban areas; to be located in the Southwest (prima-
rily Texas, but also Louisiana and Oklahoma); and to
be affiliates in multibank holding companies. Some of
the hazard functions I estimate below include tests of
whether these locational, organizational, and regulatory
characteristics affect the probability of
bank failure.
Nonparametric hazard functions
I use the bank failure data, summa-
rized in table 2, to estimate separate haz-
ard functions for newly chartered banks
and established banks, and then compare
these estimated hazard functions with
the hypothetical hazard functions in
figure 3. I employ two different hazard
function techniques to produce these
estimatesa nonparametric, or actuarial,
approach, and a parametric, or duration
model, approach.
An actuarial hazard function is sim-
ply a series of actuarial hazard rates
strung together in chronological order.
Calculating the actuarial hazard rates is
straightforward and intuitive. For example,
to calculate the 1990 hazard rate for a set
of banks that were chartered in 1985, one
simply divides the number of these banks
that failed during 1990 by the number of
the banks that still existed at the begin-
ning of 1990. Thus, the hazard rate tells
us the probability of failure in 1990 con-
ditional on having survived for five years.
The following, more exact, formula can
be used to calculate the actuarial hazard
rate for any time period, T:
hazard(T) =  
no of bank failures during T










.        





where n(t = 0) is the number of banks present at the
beginning of the analysis; f(t) represents the number
of these banks that failed during time period t; m(t)
represents the number of these banks that were ac-
quired in mergers during time period t, and T indicates
the current time period. Note the subtle adjustment to
the denominator in the second line of this formula:
The denominator is reduced by one-half the number
of banks that were acquired during the current time
period. These banks clearly did not survive until the
end of time period T, and subtracting some portion of
these banks from the denominator acknowledges the
possibility that they might have failed during time T
TABLE 2
Descriptive statistics for hazard function data sets
De novo Established
banks banks
Number of banks 303 2,350
Age of banks in 1985 (years) < 1 > 25
Federal charters (%) 43.23 84.17
Urban locations (%) 78.55 18.81
Multibank holding company (%) 32.34 11.62
Southwest states (%),
   (Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma) 32.67 10.68
Mean equity/assets 0.368 0.098
Median assets
   (current dollars in thousands) 6,204 14,415
Outcome
   (number and % of sample)
Failed before 1999 50 (16.5) 185 (7.9)
Acquired before 1999 144 (47.5) 302 (12.9)
Survived to 1999 109 (36.0) 1,863 (79.2)
Notes: The de novo banks began operations during 1985. The established
banks were operating in the same states as the de novo banks and were
at least 25 years old in 1985. For further details of the data sources and
data selection process, see “Estimating hazard functions” section of the
text. These data are used to estimate the hazard functions shown in
figures 4 and 5.
Sources: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 1985–98, “Report of
income and condition,” Washington, DC, and National Information Center,









had they not been acquired. Although weighting
these banks by one-half is a crude and ad hoc adjust-
ment, it is important to make some kind of adjustment
because, as shown in table 2, acquired banks greatly
outnumbered failed banks between 1985 and 1998.
I use the above formula to calculate 14 separate
hazard rates (one rate for each of the 14 years from
1985 through 1998) for the 303 newly chartered banks.
I repeat this exercise for the 2,350 established banks.
Plotting the resulting hazard rates in chronological
order generates two nonparametric hazard functions,
which are displayed in figure 4.
In general, the nonparametric hazard functions in
figure 4 resemble the hypothetical hazard functions
posited in figure 3. The hazard rate for newly char-
tered banks is initially zero, and it remains below the
established bank hazard rate for several years. As
discussed above, this is most likely because the typi-
cal new bank holds a healthy equity cushion at the
outset. After year three, the new bank hazard rate
exceeds the established bank hazard rate, and it re-
mains substantially higher than the established bank
hazard rate until year eight. The hazard rate for newly
chartered banks peaks in years five, six, and seven at
about 1.2 percentthat is, if a newly chartered bank
reaches the beginning of any of these years without
failing or being acquired, it has about a 1.2 percent
chance of failing before the year is out. At this point,
the typical new banks capital ratio has declined to
established bank levels, but its profitability has not
yet attained the level or degree of stability found at
established banks. After year eight, the new bank
hazard rate approaches the established bank hazard
rate from above, suggesting that the maturation of
new banks is well under way at this point.
The results displayed in figure 4 are consistent
with the simple life-cycle theory of de novo bank fail-
ure. The nonparametric techniques used to generate
figure 4 paint a good general picture of the rate at
which new banks fail relative to established banks.
But these nonparametric techniques do not control
for the survivor bias in the data and, as a result, they
understate the hazard rate at any given point in time.
BOX 2
New bank failures and new business failures
During the 14 years covered by the bank failure
dataset (see table 2), 16.5 percent of the newly
chartered banks failed, compared with only 7.9
percent of the established banks of comparable
size and location. To put these new bank failure
rates into perspective, note that a 16.5 percent fail-
ure rate over 14 years is substantially lower than
the failure rates typically reported for business
start-ups in general. Raw data reported by the
U.S. Small Business Administration (1992) suggest
that at least 60 percent of new business ventures
with less than 500 employees that started in 197778
failed within six years. Kirchhoff (1994, pp. 153169)
argues convincingly that these raw data overstate
the new business failure rate because, among oth-
er things, the data in many instances define firms
that changed owners or voluntarily shut down as
having failed. After adjusting for these and other
factors, Kirchhoff concludes that, in a best case
scenario, 18 percent of new business ventures fail
within eight years of start-upabout the same
rate of failure as the de novo banks but in half the
number of years. Furthermore, the 16.5 percent fail-
ure rate for new banks occurred during the worst
period of bank failures since the Great Depression.
It should not be surprising that new banks
have a better rate of survival than other new busi-
nesses. Both federal and state bank regulators
deny charters to applicants with questionable finan-
cial credentials, restrict business activities, require
high amounts of capital, apply regular scrutiny via
on-site exams, and have the power to revoke bank
charters. Banking start-ups face more severe entry
barriers and ongoing scrutiny than new business-
es in most other industries, and this selection bias
naturally leads to a higher survival for new banks.29 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Furthermore, these techniques are not useful for test-
ing how much, if any, of the difference between the new
bank and established bank failure rates is caused by
the economic, regulatory, and organizational condi-
tions under which newly chartered banks operate.
In the final step in this analysis, I use econometric
duration analysis to estimate hazard functions. These
parametric methods account for survivor bias and
control for environmental conditions that can affect
the probability of failure.
Parametric hazard functions
Duration analysis is a statistical regression ap-
proach. The dependent variable in these regressions
is t, the length of time that passes between a new
banks start-up date and its subsequent failure. For
established banks, t is the length of time between its
first observation in the dataset (in this case, the first
quarter of 1985) and its subsequent failure. The period
measured by t is often referred to as a banks duration.
Because the banks in this dataset are observed quar-
terly, duration will range from t = 1 for banks that fail
during the quarter in which they begin operations, to
t = 56 for banks that fail in the fourth quarter of 1998.
The simplest duration approach includes no
explanatory variables. The analyst starts by selecting
a probability distribution formula that has a shape
that is roughly similar to the actual distribution of the
duration variable t, and uses maximum likelihood tech-
niques to estimate parameter values that shape that
probability distribution formula more exactly to the
actual duration data. Here, I use a log-logistic distri-
bution formula, because this is capable of producing
hazard functions that have shapes similar to the hazard
functions in figures 3 and 4. (Details of these duration
model procedures can be found in the appendix to this
article or in Greene, 1997). Once the parameters of the
distribution formula have been estimated, they can be
used to construct hazard functions as follows:
hazard(T) =  
f(T)
1   F(T) –
,
where f(T) is the probability that a bank fails at time T
(that is, the log-logistic probability density) and F(T)
is the probability that a bank fails before time T (that
is, the log-logistic cumulative probability distribution).
The denominator, 1  F(T), is the log-logistic survival
function, which is the probability that a bank neither
fails nor is acquired before time T. This parametric
hazard function has the same general interpretation
as the nonparametric hazard function calculated in
the previous sectionthey are both estimates of the
probability that a bank will fail at time T given that it
has survived until time T. One difference is that the
hazard function generated by this parametric approach
will be a smooth and continuous function of time sim-
ilar to the hypothetical hazard functions in figure 3,
as opposed to the segmented nonparametric hazard
function in figure 4.
The duration models I estimate here control for
survivor problems in the data. Recall that many of the
sample banks either survived beyond the end of the
sample period or were acquired during the sample pe-
riod. These banks are known as censored observations.
We cannot assign a duration value t to these banks
because we cannot observe their ultimate fate (failure
or survival). Furthermore, history suggests that very
few of these banks will eventually fail, so including
them in hazard rate calculations creates a downward
bias by inflating the survival function 1  F(t). Dura-
tion models can adjust for this problem by estimating
the probability that censored banks will eventually
fail, and then weighting the censored observations by
this probability before estimating the parameters of the
hazard function. (See the appendix for more details.)
The sample banks differ in terms of their geo-
graphic location, their organizational form, and their
primary regulator. These characteristics could make
a bank more or less likely to fail, or given that a bank
does fail, these characteristics could influence how
quickly it fails. For example, banks located in depressed
economic regions will be more likely to fail and, absent
regulatory intervention, will fail more quickly than
banks located in economically healthy markets. Dura-
tion models can include a vector of independent vari-
ables, typically known as covariates, measuring the
characteristics that vary across banks but remain
constant for each bank over the sample period. I use
a split population approach which estimates two re-
gression coefficients for each of the covariates in the
duration model. The first coefficient measures the
covariates impact on the probability that a bank will
survivea negative coefficient indicates that the
covariate is associated with a lower probability of
survival (higher probability of failure). The second
coefficient measures the covariates impact on a
banks durationgiven that a bank will eventually
fail, a negative coefficient indicates that the covariate
is associated with a shorter duration (a faster failure).
The duration models I estimate include four co-
variates, each of which is expressed as a (0, 1) dummy
variable. OCC = 1 if the bank holds a federal charter
(as opposed to a state charter). The OCC has tradition-
ally practiced a more lenient chartering policy than
most state chartering authorities, relying on market30 Economic Perspectives
forces rather than administrative rules to determine
the number of banks a market could support.7 A nega-
tive coefficient on OCC would suggest that this poli-
cy caused new national banks to fail more often and/
or more quickly, on average, than new state-chartered
banks. INDEPENDENT = 1 if the bank is either a free-
standing business or a one-bank holding company
(as opposed to being an affiliate of a multibank hold-
ing company) throughout the sample period. A nega-
tive coefficient on INDEPENDENT would suggest
that banks not having access to the financial strength
and managerial expertise of a multibank holding com-
pany tend to fail more often and/or more quickly.
MSA = 1 if the bank is located in an urban area. Banks
in urban areas face greater competition than rural
banks, but also may have greater opportunities for
diversification. A negative coefficient on MSA would
suggest that, on balance, these conditions cause
banks in urban areas to fail more often and/or more
quickly than rural banks. SW = 1 if the bank is located
in the southwestern states of Louisiana, Texas, or
Oklahoma, which experienced large numbers of bank
failures during the mid- to late 1980s due to disruptions
in energy-related industries. One would expect the
coefficients on SW to be negative, reflecting lower
survival probabilities and shorter duration times for
banks in this region.
I add these four covariates to the duration model
merely to illustrate how conditions and events exter-
nal to the bank can affect its probability of failure and
its time to failure. These four variables are not meant
to be an exhaustive list of such conditions. Similarly,
the duration model I estimate here is by no means de-
finitive of the duration model techniques available to
researchers. Other duration approaches do exist, in-
cluding those that allow for time-varying covariates
(for example, changes in economic, regulatory, or
competitive conditions during each banks duration).
However, the multiple approaches I employ (including
the Z-score and actuarial hazard function analysis
conducted above) serve the purpose of this study,
which is to test the simple life-cycle theory of de novo
bank failure summarized in figure 3.
Table 3 displays the results of the duration models
estimated separately for newly chartered banks and
established banks. The estimated probability that the
average bank will eventually fail is 19.65 percent for
de novo banks and 8.93 percent for established banks.
Note that these estimated failure probabilities are some-
what higher than the raw failure percentages shown
at the bottom of table 2. In each case, the estimated
probability is higher than the raw percentage because
of the possibility that some of the censored observa-
tions will eventually fail.
Although established banks are less likely to fail,
those that do fail have relatively short durations. Of
the established banks that are expected to eventually
fail, half of them will fail within an estimated 9.8 quar-
ters (about 2.5 years) after the beginning of the sample
period. Consistent with the life-cycle theory, newly
chartered banks fail more slowly than established
banks. It takes an estimated 21.1 quarters (about 5.25
years) for half of the de novo banks that are expected
to fail to do so.
These differences in average duration can be
seen clearly in figure 5, which charts the estimated
hazard rates from the de novo and established bank
duration models. Each of these functions is plotted
based on the estimated coefficients shown in table 3
and the average values of the covariates for each
sample. In general, these two estimated hazard func-
tions resemble the shapes displayed above in figures
3 and 4. Thus, after controlling for censored data and
a variety of environmental conditions, the failure pat-
terns of newly chartered banks still differ substantial-
ly from the failure patterns of established banks.
The estimated probability of failure for established
banks starts out above zero; peaks at about 8 percent
for banks that survive for two years; and then slowly
declines as the bank failure wave dissipates (see fig-
ure 1). In contrast, the estimated probability of failure
for de novo banks starts out at zero and remains lower
than the established bank hazard rate for three years;
increases rapidly and peaks at nearly 14 percent for
banks the survive for seven years; and then declines
relatively quickly and begins to approach the estab-
lished bank hazard rate. Note that both of these hazard
functions peak much higher on the vertical scale than
did the actuarial hazard functions plotted in figure 4.
Thus, by not controlling for censored observations
and the overall low probability of eventual failure, the
actuarial model substantially understated the hazard
rates. Also, note that the hazard rates in figure 5 are
in decline but are still positive at year 14, which reflects
the non-zero probability of failure for the censored
observations.
As expected, being located in one of the south-
western states reduces the probability of survival (or
increases the probability of failure) for both de novo
and established banks. Failing de novo banks also
failed more quickly in this region, but failing established
banks had longer than average durations. The latter
result may indicate that regulators allowed troubled
banks with longstanding business relationships (and,
hence, more franchise value) more time to recover
before stepping in to resolve them.8 Being located in
a metropolitan statistical area reduced the probability31 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
TABLE 3
Selected results from parametric duration models
De novo banks Established banks
Number of banks in sample 303 2,350
Average predicted failure probability 19.65% 8.93%
Predicted time for 50 percent of banks to fail 21.1 quarters 9.8 quarters
Probability of survival parameter estimates
Constant 1.2930** 1.2475***
(0.5144) (0.2145)
OCC (= 1 if national bank) 0.0197 –0.1296
(0.2242) (0.1117)
SW (= 1 if in Louisiana, Oklahoma, or Texas) –0.3928* –0.7419***
(0.2219) (0.0992)
MSA (= 1 if urban bank) –0.5266* 0.2530**
(0.3205) (0.1163)
INDEPENDENT (= 1 if independent or sole bank in
   a one-bank holding company) –0.5265**
(0.2386) #











*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Notes: Both models are estimated using the data sets described in table 2. Standard errors are in
parentheses. # indicates that it was necessary to exclude the variable INDEPENDENT to make the









of survival for de novo banks, but increased both the
probability of survival for established banks and the
survival time for established banks likely to eventual-
ly fail. Recall that intense competitive rivalry can cause
banks to fail in urban markets, and that the lack of diver-
sification opportunities can cause banks to fail in
rural markets. The results suggest that these two
phenomena affect de novo banks and established
banks differentlyon balance, de novo banks may
be more sensitive to competition than to diversifica-
tion risk, while small established banks may be more
affected by a lack of diversification than by competi-
tive rivalry. Being an independent bank or banking
organization also reduces the probability of survival
for de novo banks, which suggests that having access
to the resources of multibank holding companies helps32 Economic Perspectives
new banks survive. (I excluded this covariate from the
established bank model because its presence pre-
vented the model from converging.) The identity of
a banks primary regulator (OCC or state) is not a sig-
nificant determinant of the probability of survival or
the survival time for either set of banks.
Conclusion
Like all new business ventures, banks start with
a business plan but no guarantee of success. So,
despite the regulatory safeguards of on-site examina-
tions, capital requirements, and other risk controls, we
should not be surprised to find that new banks are
more likely to fail than established banks. This article
offers a simple framework that explains not only why
but also when new banks are likely to fail.
My results suggest that the primary determinant
of new bank failure is how new the bank is. Ironically,
de novo banks are relatively unlikely to fail during
their first few years of operation when they are earn-
ing negative profits. They are relatively more likely to
fail during the years of positive profits that follow.
Brand new, but unprofitable, banks are typically pro-
tected from failure by large initial capital cushions.
However, equity cushions at de novo banks typically
decline to established bank levels several years before
their earnings become stable enough to justify these
relatively low levels of capital.
What are the implications of this result for capital
regulation at newly chartered banks? If ensuring a
high rate of survival for de novo banks is a regulatory
objective, then this result offers support for requiring
high levels of start-up capital for new banks, and for
holding young banks to higher capital requirements.
Higher levels of required capital will make newly char-
tered banks less vulnerable to failure. Under such
policies, de novo entrants might be a more credible
long-run deterrent to market power in consolidating
local markets. Indeed, in the wake of the wave of de
novo bank failures during the 1980s, federal bank
supervisory agencies did impose higher capital require-
ments on newly chartered banks.
On the other hand, promoting the safety and
soundness of the banking system does not require
that regulators prevent all bank failures, much less
all failures of new banks. At some point, attempting
to improve the survival rate of de novo banks by in-
creasing the amount of capital necessary for investors
to secure the charter will act as an entry barrier. Simi-
larly, increasing the required capital ratios for young
banks with charters already in hand will, at some
point, depress investors expected rates of return and
discourage investment in new banks. Higher capital
requirements for young banks could also slow the rate
at which they can grow their balance sheets, hamper-
ing the beneficial impact of new banks in markets
where existing banks (perhaps with market power)
are not adequately serving the banking public.
What are the implications of this study for the
bank chartering decision? During the period covered
by this study, some state chartering authorities would
approve or deny a charter application only after con-
sidering whether a local market needed an additional
bank, based on the number of banks already serving
the market and the expected rate of local economic
growth. These restrictive chartering policies sought
to reduce bank failure rates, and the financial disrup-
tions that accompany them, by limiting competition
in local banking markets. In contrast, the federal char-
tering authority practiced a liberal entry policy that
explicitly ignored these convenience and needs
issues, stressing instead the potential procompetitive
benefits of de novo entry. My results indicate that
the de novo national banks chartered in 1985 were no
more likely to fail, or to fail quickly, than the de novo
state banks chartered in that same year. This suggests
that the benefits of a liberal chartering policy can be
achieved without substantial increases in de novo
bank failure rates. Additional research might confirm
whether these findings, which are based on data from
just 303 new banks chartered in a single year, also
hold for banks chartered in other years and/or under
different economic and regulatory circumstances.33 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
APPENDIX
Split population duration models
The parametric hazard functions described in the text
begin with the assumption that a population of N
banks will fail over time period (0,t) according to
some probability distribution:
Ft ftd t
t 16  =  () ,
0I
where t represents time and f(t) is the probability den-
sity function associated with F(t). The hazard function














where S(t) = 1  F(t) is the survival function and
0<T<t. Thus, h(T) gives the probability (that is, the
hazard rate) that a bank will fail at T conditional on
surviving until T.
The general shape of the estimated hazard func-
tion will depend on the underlying probability distri-
bution chosen to fit the data. I use the log-logistic
distribution because it is capable of producing the
hazard function shapes hypothesized in figure 3. The
log-logistic distribution imposes the following func-
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where the parameters p and l give the hazard function
its exact shape. The parameter p captures duration
dependence or whether the hazard rate increases or
decreases across time. The parameter l captures the
portion of the hazard rate that is time-invariant. This
parameter, which can take on different values for dif-
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where the bank index i ranges from 1 to N, and Xi is a
vector of bank-specific covariates that do not vary
over time. Table 3 reports the estimated values of b
under the heading survival time parameter estimates.
I use these b estimates to evaluate the above expres-
sion at the means of the covariates, which results in
l = 0.0474 for the average de novo bank and 0.1019
for the average established bank. The parameter p is
a constant that does not vary across banks; it equals
5.0175 for the de novo bank model and 1.6333 for the
established bank model.
All of the parameters of the duration models in
this study were estimated using maximum likelihood
techniques. The standard estimation procedure for
duration models starts with the following likelihood
function:
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where Qi = 1 if bank i failed during the sample period
(an uncensored observation) and Qi = 0 if bank i
survived or was acquired during the sample period
(a censored observation). Substituting h(t)/S(t) for
f(t) and performing a log transformation produces the
log-likelihood function to be maximized:
ln  =   ln  +  ln   , 
=1 =1
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where i£UC are the uncensored observations. Once I
have estimated the parameters p and b, I can calculate
the median time to failure by setting S(t) = 0.50 and
solving for t.
This standard approach is based on the assump-
tion that all of the censored banks will eventually fail
(or would have eventually failed had they not been
acquired). This assumption is inappropriate for the
data used here, however, because over 80 percent of
the de novo banks were censored observations, and
over 90 percent of the established banks were cen-
sored observations. Given the nature of the data, I
use a more general framework that avoids making this
assumption. In the split population duration model,
an additional estimable parameter d, the probability
that a bank eventually fails, enters the likelihood
function as follows:
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Both Cole and Gunther (1995) and Hunter,
Verbrugge, and Whidbee (1996) estimate split popula-
tion models of financial institution failure. Note that
this formulation collapses to the standard framework
when d = 1. But when d<1, the functions S(t) and f(t)
become conditional on the bank eventually failing.
Thus, the estimated hazard function h(t) = f(t)/S(t)34 Economic Perspectives
will not be unduly influenced by censored observa-
tions of banks that have little chance of ever failing.
The parameter d can vary across banks as a function
of a banks covariate values:






Table 3 reports the estimated values of a under
the heading is probability of survival parameter esti-
mates. I use these a estimates to evaluate the above
NOTES
1Note that such ambiguity is largely absent from studies that
examine the determinants of local market entry by already
established banks. For a recent example, see Amel and Liang
(1997). In general, these studies tend to find that established
banks are more likely to enter highly profitable local banking
markets, but less likely to enter highly concentrated local
banking markets. Of course, the causes and consequences of a
new bank start-up may be quite different from the causes and
consequences of market entry by an already established bank.
2Seelig and Critchfield (1999) find that, on average, the state
chartering authorities remain relatively more likely than the
OCC to consider the ability of local banking markets to support
an additional bank when evaluating a charter application. The
authors show that income per capita per branch in the local
banking market was a substantially stronger predictor of de
novo state bank entry than of de novo national bank entry
between 1995 and 1997.
3See DeYoung and Hasan (1998) for a more complete review of
this literature.
4Examples of studies that have used hazard rates to analyze
financial institution failure include Whalen (1991); Wheelock
and Wilson (1995); Cole and Gunther (1995); Helwege (1996);
and Hunter, Verbrugge, and Whidbee (1996).
5The Z-score is a measure of the probability that a firms losses
(negative profits) will exceed its equity capital. See Brewer
(1989) for a discussion of the Z-score and its use in banking
research.
6There are a number of possible reasons for this. In general,
 Z-score analysis performs best when used to represent the
likelihood that an individual firm will become insolvent and,
as such, Z-scores are typically constructed based on the known
distribution (the mean and standard deviation) of ROA for an
individual firm. In contrast, these average Z-scores are con-
structed for groups of banks, and rely on the cross-sectional
distribution (the median and standard deviation) of ROA for
each group of banks. As mentioned in the text, the distribution
of ROA is not normally distributed, but rather is relatively
skewed. Hence, it would be inappropriate to use the absolute
levels of these average Z-scores to draw statistical inferences
about the probability of bank failure.
7See Hunter and Srinivasan (1990) and DeYoung and Hasan
(1998) for discussions that compare historical federal and
state chartering policies.
8There are many potential reasons for the high bank failure
rates in Texas, and for the relatively shorter durations for de
novo banks in Texas, during the 1980s and 1990s. These reasons
include unexpected economic shocks, unit banking restrictions
that limited geographic diversification, a relatively undiversi-
fied regional economy, and regulatory failure.
expression at the means of the covariates, which results
in d = 0.1965 for the average de novo bank and 0.0893
for the average established bank.
The hazard functions plotted in figure 5 show
the probability that the average bank will fail at time t,
given that the bank has not yet failed but will even-
tually fail. Thus, the shapes of the plotted hazard
functions are based on the estimated values of  l and
p, but not on the estimated values of d.
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